Amaanyi Amagonvu/硬实力
Soft Power/Hard Power

Mandela National Stadium (also known locally as Namboole) shows China’s contemporary phase of stadium diplomacy where soft power is no longer the primary objective. While the stadium’s construction and renovation, both financed and carried out by Chinese firms, has delivered clear public benefits through improved infrastructure and national sporting pride, the Chinese role in the project remains largely unknown to the general public. For most Ugandans, the stadium is experienced simply as a domestic development success rather than a product of foreign partnership.

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Soft power traditionally relies on visibility and recognition to generate goodwill, yet in Uganda, Chinese influence operates without public attribution. Instead, the political value is accrued at the state level. The Ugandan government benefits from both the material improvements to national infrastructure and the political capital generated by public satisfaction, while also securing external financing and technical capacity from China. Additionally, international legitimacy is gained by hosting events like CAN at Namboole.

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The absence of public awareness of China’s involvement in the stadium is purposeful. In other projects, like the Kampala–Entebbe Expressway, China’s role is explicitly acknowledged through signage and toll infrastructure, yet Namboole does without. This invisibility helps shield Chinese involvement from public scrutiny and potential backlash, particularly in a environment where concerns have emerged about Chinese firms outcompeting local contractors and becoming too deeply embedded in the domestic economy.

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Instead of working to regain public trust, Chinese engagement changed to cultivating relationships with political elites, allowing them to take credit while still reaping economic benefits. Now Chinese engagement in Uganda is seen as more peaceful and respectful of national development paths, offering infrastructure without explicit political conditionality or demands for governance reform, compared to Western counterparts which are often associated with institutional prescriptions and policy changes.

Namboole is not an isolated project but part of a bigger plan to deliver public goods through external capital and expertise and gradually normalizing foreign involvement in core state functions. Stadiums, unlike other infrastructure projects such as roads or power plants, are closely tied to national identity. By operating in this space, China inserts itself into moments of collective pride and political legitimacy without requiring popular recognition. 

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Rather than shaping hearts and minds, China’s stadium diplomacy in Uganda shapes political economies, embedding Chinese capital and firms within national development trajectories. The durability of this influence lies precisely in its invisibility. Namboole exemplifies a mature phase of stadium diplomacy where infrastructure is no longer merely a gift, but a Trojan horse.